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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

White Water also applied to the town of Middlefield Inland
Wetlands and Watercourse Agency ("Agency") for approval of road
construction activities that would affect wetlands. The Agency held
public hearings concerning the application.
After the hearings and during the deliberation, the Agency
members discussed the drainage calculations for the new road's runoff. The Agency's expert presented the members with a technical
memorandum to explain the dynamics of a perched water table to
help the Agency determine alternative drainage points. The Agency
later granted White Water's application by finding that the road
building activities would not likely impair the water or the natural
resources.
Citizens sued the Agency for accepting ex parte information from
the Agency's engineer after the public hearing period depriving
Citizens of their right to a fair hearing. The court held that receiving
information of a technical nature from an Agency engineer did not
constitute ex parte information.
Madoline Wallace

Reynolds v. City of Bristol, No. CV 970482675, 1999 WL 240064
(Conn. Super. Ct. March 29, 1999) (holding that city's condemnation
proceedings were within city's authority as authorized by special
legislative act).
The City of Bristol ("Bristol") owned and operated a landfill that
began to leak contaminants into surrounding waterways. In 1995, the
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection entered a
Consent Order with Bristol. The Consent Order required that Bristol
test and monitor the contamination and propose plans to remediate
the pollution. The Consent Order also required Bristol to acquire
control over all water rights or interests that were either contaminated
or potentially contaminated.
To assist Bristol in complying with the Consent Order, the
Connecticut General Assembly passed Special Act 96-12 ("Special Act")
allowing municipalities to condemn property rights outside their
corporate limits. In 1997, Bristol's City Council passed a resolution to
comply with the Consent Order.
This resolution authorized Bristol to acquire certain property
rights necessary to comply with the Consent Order. Bristol then
initiated condemnation proceedings against Thomas Reynolds.
Reynolds challenged Bristol's actions, claiming that the condemnation
proceedings exceeded the scope of the Special Act, and were therefore
ultra vires. Both parties stipulated to the relevant facts, and both
moved for summary judgment. The issue was whether Bristol, by
condemning Reynolds' property, acted within the authority granted by
the Special Act.
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To resolve this issue, the court applied basic rules of statutory
construction. After finding that the Special Act's plain language was
vague, the court analyzed the legislative history. Noting that the
Special Act was not intended as a 'blanket law,' the court found the
Special Act was "specially tailored to meet the needs of Bristol, as
opposed to any other municipality in the state." Thus, the court found
that it was plain "from the legislative history that the legislature
contemplated that Bristol would have such statutory authority" to
condemn property easements necessary to satisfy the Consent Order's
Bristol's
requirements. Disallowing
testing and monitoring
condemnation proceedings against Reynolds would be directly
contrary to the Special Act's legislative purpose.
The court concluded Bristol acted within the scope of the Special
The court also found that Bristol followed the proper
Act.
proceedings necessary to condemn Reynolds' property. Therefore,
the court refused to enjoin Bristol's condemnation proceedings
against Reynolds.
Michael Fischer

FLORIDA
City of West Palm Beach v. Board of Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund, Nos. 93,821, 1999 WL 731654 (Fla. Sept. 9,
1999) (holding that dredging of submerged lands did not constitute a
"permanent improvement" under the Butler Act and divestiture of title
in State submerged lands did not occur).
In 1947, the City of West Palm Beach ("City") obtained a building
permit under the Butler Act ("Act") and its predecessor the Riparian
Rights Act. The Act divested the state's title to submerged lands if
upland owners constructed improvements. The Act's purpose was to
encourage the state's waterfront development. The City constructed a
municipal marina on the submerged land of Florida's sovereign land.
The City also dredged a boat basin in the area surrounding the piers.
Ten years later the legislature repealed the Act, however, it confirmed
title for all upland riparian owners who bulk-headed or filled in or
permanently improved the submerged land before the Act's repeal.
In 1994, the City sued to quiet title to the twenty-six acres of
submerged lands around the marina including the dredged
bottomlands. The Board of Trustees conceded that the City was
entitled to title for the land under the docks, but contested the action
regarding title for the dredged bottomlands. The trial court entered
summary judgment for the Board of Trustees and concluded that the
dredging of the bottomlands did not constitute a permanent
improvement under the Act. The appellate court reversed and
granted a rehearing on which they affirmed the trial court order for

